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Introduction

1
Frictions are essential in macroeconomic modeling. Empirically-oriented DSGE models, following Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), Smets and Wouters (2003) , and Gertler, Sala, and Trigari (2008), often feature sticky prices, sticky wages, investment adjustment costs, consumption habits, and search and matching in the labor market, among other frictions. Similarly, errors are essential in game theory. Theoretical models often fit experimental data better under equilibrium concepts that incorporate errors in choice, such as quantal response equilibrium McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1998) , or its special case, logit equilibrium. In addition, equilibrium concepts such as trembling hand equilibrium (Selten 1975) , quantal response equilibrium, and control cost equilibrium (Stahl 1990 ; Van Damme 1991, Chapter 4; Mattsson and Weibull 2002) have been useful for resolving some behavioral puzzles associated with fully rational Nash equilibria, and for studying robustness (relative to full rationality) in order to select between multiple equilibria or between different equilibrium concepts (Moreno and Wooders 1998; Holt 1999, 2001 ; Anderson, Goeree, and Holt 2002) .
Control cost equilibria are based on the assumption that errors occur because decisions are costly. A decision is conceived as a random variable distributed over a set of possible actions, and the cost of the decision is assumed to increase with the precision of this random variable. The player maximizes the payoffs that would obtain in a costlessly rational game, net of the decision costs. Usually, a player prefers to spread probability across many possible actions (thus committing "errors") rather than concentrating all probability on a single action, because the latter is excessively costly. Thus, players are sophisticated enough to consider the costs and limitations of their own rationality when they make choices -an appealing property.
Realistically, time use is likely to be an important component of the costs of choice. Time devoted to decision-making may have an opportunity cost, and also implies discounting of the terminal payoffs received when the choice is made. In the context of the independent choices of a single decision-maker, which resources are consumed by the choice process may be irrelevant, since time, money, and other resources may be fungible. But time-consuming choice could be an important feature of a game, as it could have strategic implications, representing an opportunity for other players to intervene with actions of their own. Therefore, the time used up by decisions should be reflected in the extensive form of the game. Accordingly, this paper explores the game-theoretic implications of control cost equilibrium when we take the role of time in decision-making seriously. In doing so, it also extends a model of intermittent updating -essentially an error-prone (S,s) model -that could prove useful for addressing many frictions that appear in DSGE models.
The model, developed in Section 2, studies a decision-maker (DM) who may choose quickly or slowly, and can make a more accurate decision by choosing more slowly. 2 As in previous papers on control costs, "choosing" means allocating probability across a set of feasible actions. 3 Unlike 1 The author is grateful for helpful discussions with Henrique Basso, Filip Matejka, Pascal Michaillat, Espen Moen, Anton Nakov, Plamen Nenov, Galo Nuño, Ariel Rubinstein, Antonella Trigari, and Ernesto Villanueva, and from seminar participants at the Banco de España, the Univ. of Murcia, UC Santa Cruz, Univ. Carlos III, CEF 2014, SaM 2015, ESSIM 2015, CEF 2015, EEA 2015, and the Eighth Workshop on Theoretical and Experimental Macroeconomics (Stony Brook, 2017) . Views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily coincide with those of the Bank of Spain or the Eurosystem.
2 Rubinstein (2013) presents experimental evidence that slower decisions are more accurate. 3 For a discussion of decisions as random variables, see Machina (1985) or Chapter 2 of Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992).
previous papers, the DM is also assumed to control the arrival rate of the decision. Holding fixed other uses of time, a slower arrival rate implies more time dedicated to the decision, and this, by assumption, permits a more precise allocation of probabilities across the action set. While a variety of statistics could serve as measures of precision, this paper focuses on a special case in which precision is measured by relative entropy. This proves analytically convenient, because the probability of each feasible action then takes the form of a multinomial logit (as in Mattsson and Weibull, 2002) .
Note, however, that in many dynamic situations there is a default option that occurs in the absence of any deliberate action. Our model allows for situations of this type by treating the timing of any deliberate choice as a time-consuming, error-prone decision too. Under the functional forms assumed in the paper, decision timing is determined by a weighted binary logit (as in Woodford, 2008) . Considering errors on both margins-the choice itself, and the timing of the choice-actually simplifies the analysis, because it helps rule out corner solutions. While the model can have several types of corner solutions in the limiting case where timing is perfectly rational (see Section 2.1), it has a well-behaved interior solution when timing is error prone (Secs. 2.2-2.3). Interestingly, the model implies a relationship between the accuracy of decision-making across the two margins (the choice itself, and its timing), as well as a relation between the accuracy of decision-making and the value of time. These implications of the model may be empirically testable, especially in the laboratory.
As an application, Section 3 embeds the model of costly decisions into a game where two players bargain to split a pie. Time-consuming, error-prone choice is assumed both at the stage of offering a share to the other player, and at the stage of accepting or rejecting the other player's proposal. The game closely resembles that of Perry and Reny (1993) , in which two players make offers to split a pie, and making an offer, or reacting to an offer, requires a nonnegative amount of time. But whereas Perry and Reny treat the decision time as an exogenous fixed cost, and assume that all decisions are optimal, here the decision-maker can vary precision by choosing more or less quickly. Also, while Perry and Reny equate rejecting an offer with making an alternative offer, these decisions are distinct in our setup; Sections 3.1-3.3 compare several different bargaining protocols.
Sections 3.4-3.5 further explore bargaining equilibrium by numerical simulation. The equilibrium resembles that of the Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) framework, except that the time to reach agreement is nonzero, and offers are not always accepted. The simulations show that equilibrium changes in intuitive ways as underlying parameters vary; this is true even in an example where parameters imply that splitting the pie is a bad idea. Finally, we explore uniqueness of equilibrium. While the game of Perry and Reny (1993) has multiple equilibria in which players receive different bargaining shares, in our game we find a unique equilibrium as long as the space of possible offers is a sufficiently fine grid. Section 4 concludes.
Related literature
This paper is closely related to previous work on sequential bargaining under complete information, including Rubinstein (1982) , and Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) . Wolinsky (1987) and Hall and Milgrom (2008) have emphasized the implications of bargaining theory for wages in matching models. Perry and Reny (1993) studied bargaining when making offers, or responding to offers, requires a fixed, nonnegative quantity of time. Bono and Wolpert (2010) study a bargaining game in which offers are stochastic, either due to errors or due to other unmodeled variation across players. Merlo and Wilson (1995, 1998) and Merlo and Wilson (2010) study bargaining games where the pie evolves randomly over time.
This paper is also motivated by the author's previous work on price stickiness. Costain and Nakov (2015, henceforth CN15) showed that a control cost approach is fruitful for modeling microdata on intermittent retail price adjustment. They showed that two types of errors were relevant for the empirical success of their model. Errors in which price to set, conditional on adjustment, help explain a number of empirical puzzles on retail prices; errors in the timing of adjustment help explain the macroeconomic finding of significant monetary nonneutrality. The present paper extends their framework by allowing for a nonlinear cost of time and shows how it can be used to endogenize the order and timing of actions in an extensive-form game. 4 Another motivation for this paper is its potential for unifying the analysis of several margins in labor markets. Cheremukhin, Restrepo-Echevarria, and Tutino (2012) have shown how a matching function can be derived from a model of costly choice over a set of partners (who are themselves, likewise, engaged in costly choice). The present paper applies a similar cost function to the decisions involved in a bargaining game, which could be used to model to wage negotiations. Since the time to reach agreement is strictly positive (in contrast to Rubinstein (1982) and most related models) the present model could also be applied to duration data on wage negotiations and/or strikes. After a bargain is accepted, the same model of error-prone timing could be applied to each partner's option to reopen the negotiations, which is a natural way of modeling wage stickiness. Likewise, this decision framework could be applied to each partner's separation decision. Thus, wage stickiness and separation could be treated jointly in this framework, as Barro (1977) advocated.
Thus, control cost equilibrium may offer a single microfoundation for many frictions that are typically viewed as distinct, including nominal rigidities and matching frictions. Applying a single model of frictions to all margins could make them easier to calibrate and compare, and could provide empirical implications about how errors vary across margins over time. Control cost models were initially developed as a more structured alternative to trembling hand equilibrium, imposing the property that more costly errors should be less likely (Van Damme 1991, Chapter 4). Starting with Stahl (1990) , many papers have shown independently how an entropy-related cost function can microfound logit decision rules (Marsili 1999 Hansen and Sargent (2007) . Control cost models are also influential in the engineering and machine learning literature; see for example Todorov (2009) . In the machine learning context, as in the reinforcement learning literature in economics (see Baron, Durieu, Haller, and Solal 2002) , control costs are applied to backward-looking behavior, whereas in the present paper they are applied to forward-looking behavior.
The rational inattention framework of Sims (1998 Sims ( , 2003 is also a general friction applicable to many different types of decisions, and it is closely related to a control cost approach. Indeed, Khaw, Stevens, and Woodford (2016) use a rational inattention approach to derive a logit model of intermittent updating, similar to framework developed here, and show that it helps explain adjustment behavior in a laboratory experiment. 5 The main difference between a rational inattention model and a control cost model is that the former places a constraint on information flow (measured in terms of entropy), while the latter places a constraint on the precision of the decision (entropy is then one possible functional form for measuring precision). One possible interpretation is that rational inattention and control costs address two different "stages" of the decision process: the initial stage of obtaining information necessary for the decision, and the final stage of actually making a choice conditional on that information. In reality, both stages are likely to be costly, and both have the same primary implication: an imperfect correlation between a player's true state and her action. But there is an important technical advantage to modeling the second stage, rather than the first: the rational inattention approach implies a 2 Models of time-consuming decisions
One costly choice
We first analyze a single costly decision, which will subsequently be a building block for more complex games. We regard a decision as a random variable distributed across a list of possible alternatives j. The cost of making a choice is that it requires time, for thinking, calculating, or otherwise comparing options on the basis of available information. 6 The decision-maker faces a tradeoff: if she chooses more quickly, her decision will be less precise. 7 Precision is measured in terms of relative entropy (also known as Kullback-Leibler divergence), which is a measure of distance from some default probability distribution η. When the choice probabilities π are set equal to the default distribution, the decision cost is zero; the time cost of any decision that deviates from the default probabilities is proportional to the Kullback-Leibler divergence. That is, the time cost of decision π is given by κD( π|| η), where η is an exogenously-given benchmark distribution over the same alternatives. 8 6 Under this interpretation, the DM is assumed to have sufficient information to evaluate the alternatives considered but is not assumed to know which option is best when the decision process begins. Therefore the presence of the values Vj in Bellman equation (2) should not be taken to mean that the DM "knows" the value of each alternative j. Instead, it can be interpreted as saying that the DM has enough information to calculate each Vj, given sufficient time.
7 The model of this subsection is closely related to the "errors-in-pricing" specification considered in CN15, and to the models of Mattsson and Weibull (2002) and Matejka and McKay (2015) : it allows for errors in a choice across a set of options, but ignores the possibility of any errors in timing.
8 The notation used here to denote the relative entropy D( p|| q) between distributions p and q is standard. When the two probability vectors have length n, the Kullback-Leibler divergence is defined as D( p|| q) ≡ j=1 pj ln(pj/qj). For a discussion, see Cover and Thomas (2006) , Chapter 2.3. Node C:
Node D:
Note: Decision maker (DM) chooses solution rate ρ t of decision; Nature lets conclusion arrive with probability ρ t . A slower decision allows more precise allocation of probabilities πj,t across alternatives i with values Vj,t+1,
much higher-dimensional model, since the decision-maker's state variable is his prior (which is typically a high-dimensional object). The simpler state space of a control cost model makes it more tractable both for DSGE modeling and for computing the equilibrium of a dynamic game, as in the current paper. spent on the choice, and we assume this permits a more precise allocation of probability across the alternatives under consideration. Fig. 1 graphs the game tree, showing one discrete time step that begins at time t (time subscripts are suppressed). Although we describe the model in discrete time, for most applications the time step should be considered very brief. 9 The DM chooses the solution rate ρ t at node C ("calculating"); the curve under node C indicates that the solution rate is chosen from the unit interval, ρ t ∈ [0, 1]. Since the actual time to reach a conclusion is stochastic, we see that the solution arrives with probability ρ t (the DM reaches the "deciding" node D), while the DM remains undecided with probability 1 − ρ t , in which case the game returns to a node of type C at time t + 1.
When Nature allows a conclusion to arrive, the DM allocates probabilities π j,t across the alternatives j ∈ Γ ≡ {1, 2, ...n}. The precision of the decision π t ≡ (π 1,t , π 2t , . . . , π n,t ) ∈ Δ n−1 is lower when the solution rate is high (since π t is a probability vector of length n, it is chosen from the simplex of order n − 1, written as Δ n−1 ). Concretely, we assume
That is, a slower decision can have greater precision, where precision is measured by the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the decision π t and the benchmark distribution η. Given the probabilities resulting from the DM's decision efforts, the actual option selected is random (chosen by nature); if option j is selected, the DM receives value V j,t+1 at time t + 1.
9 The model has a well-behaved continuous-time limit, but this paper will focus on a discrete-time formulation.
The model is written with discreteness in two dimensions: a choice set of n discrete options, and discrete time steps normalized to length one. However, we will focus on deriving solutions that are independent of this discreteness. In particular, it is helpful to measure precision by relative entropy rather than by entropy per se. Entropy does not have a finite limit as it is calculated on finer and finer grids; in contrast, relative entropy is invariant as the density of grid points increases (see Cover and Thomas, 2006, Chapter 8) . Therefore, the discreteness assumption is fundamentally just a matter of notational convenience.
The time required for more precise decisions could have a variety of costs. As in Rubinstein (1982) , we first assume that the only cost is the pure time discounting, at rate δ, associated with delay. Now, let W t denote the value of the problem at node C at time t. The value must satisfy the following Bellman equation:
and n j=1 π j = 1.
We write the multipliers on the two constraints as λ ρ and λ π , respectively. With a bit of rearrangement, the first-order condition for π j is It would be inelegant, unrealistic, and inconvenient to assume that the time required to solve a decision problem is exactly known. So rather than assuming that the DM chooses the solution time directly, we assume that she controls the arrival rate, ρ, of the solution. The expected duration of the choice process is (approximately) 1/ρ; a slower solution rate implies more time
where
Hence, π j is proportional to the exponential of the value of alternative j, scaled by a coefficient β t which indicates the precision of the choice. Since the probabilities must sum to one, (5) is solved by a multinomial logit across the various alternatives j:
It is now helpful to introduce the notation E πt x t+1 ≡ n j=1 π j,t x j,t+1 , representing the time t expectation of a random variable x t+1 with distribution π t . For example, for the default distribution η, we will write E η x = n j=1 η j x j . Note that the logit probabilities (7) imply
and therefore
Here E πt V t+1 is the expected value of finishing the decision, which is
The function K(β) represents the entropy cost of achieving precision level β when probabilities are allocated optimally across the alternatives, according to (7). Given the precision coefficient β t , defined in (6), the first-order condition for the solution rate ρ t can be written as follows:
This gives us two different equations for the cost measure D: (9) expresses the time cost when the probabilities π j,t are allocated optimally across alternatives i, and (11) optimally trades off the solution cost D against the benefit of finding a solution, which is E πt V t+1 −W t+1 . Combining (9) and (11), both D and β t E πt V t+1 cancel, leaving one simple equation to determine β t , given the values V t+1 and W t+1 of the alternatives and of continuation:
or equivalently, 10
The function g(β, V ) ≡ ln(E η exp(βV )) that appears on the right-hand side of (12) is called the cumulant generating function of the random variable V under distribution η. (It is the log of the moment generating function.) To clarify the behavior of the equation (12) that determines β, it is helpful to state some properties of the functions g and K. 
(f.) The cost of achieving perfect precision is lim β→∞ K(β) = − ln η * , where η * is the default probability on the option with value V * . Therefore lim β→∞ K (β) = 0.
Points (b) and (c) follow directly by differentiating and then simplifying using the logit formula (7). The derivative in (c) is nonnegative since it represents the variance of the payoff V when choices are distributed according to (7). Point (d) follows from the fact that exp(x) is convex, so E η exp(βV ) ≥ exp(βE η V ), with equality only if all values V j are equal. Therefore if there is If instead V * ≤ Wt+1, then g(β, Vt+1) lies everywhere below βWt+1, and postponement is optimal; see Prop. 1(a).
If instead E η Vt+1 ≥ Wt+1, the g(β, Vt+1) lies everywhere above βWt+1, and the corner β t = 0 is optimal; see Prop. 1(c).
any difference across the values V j , we have ln( 
Then the nonnegative slope of K follows from (c), and we also obtain K (0) = 0. Part (f) can be shown by direct calculation of the cost of placing probability one on the option with the maximal value V * . Since K has a finite limit, this also shows that lim β→∞ K (β) = 0. Thus, as long as there is any variation in the values V j , the function K(β) is S-shaped: it has zero slope at β = 0 and as β → ∞, and it is strictly positive sloped for all β ∈ (0, ∞).
Figure 2 uses these properties of g to show how to solve for the optimal precision, β t . We study the solution of problem (2) when W t+1 and V t+1 are taken as a given, as is the case when we solve (2) by backwards induction. By Lemma 1(b), the curve g(β, V t+1 ), plotted as a function of β, has slope E η V t+1 at the origin, and its slope converges to V * ≡ max j V j,t+1 as β → ∞. Therefore, since g is convex, there exists exactly one positive β t that solves (12) as long as E η V t+1 < W t+1 < V * . This β t solves a given iteration step of (2), as long as the period length is sufficiently short.
Proposition 1 states this conclusion formally, and also describes the corner solutions that arise when the period length is longer, or when W t+1 lies outside of the bounds consistent with an interior solution. 11
11 Besides the three solution classes described in Prop. 1, when computing the model we must also consider the possibility of numerical overflow. Even if the true solution is theoretically an interior solution β * , the calculations will overflow on a computer if j exp(β * Vj,t+1) > ∞ NUM , where ∞ NUM is the largest real number representable by the computer. A similar caveat applies to the immediate solutions discussed in Prop. 1(c). When this arises in our numerical simulations, we set β * to a large finite number that avoids overflow.
Proposition 1 Consider problem (2)-(4), taking
Then it is optimal to postpone solving, setting the arrival rate ρ t = 0, achieving the value (2)- (4) is solved with infinite precision.
The main point is that if V * > W t+1 and the time step is sufficiently short, then an interior solution applies, and precision is given by the unique positive β t that solves (12). Knowing β t , we can solve for the other endogenous quantities in the model: π j,t and E πt V t+1 are given by (7) and (10), the entropy cost D t is given by (9), and the solution rate is
However, if the value V * of the best available option is less than the continuation value W t+1 , then the decision should simply be postponed. If instead V * > W t+1 and a precision level greater than or equal to the β * that solves (12) can be achieved within a single time step, it is optimal to do so. Under this corner solution, the equilibrium precision β t can be backed out from the time constraint. If β t is finite, it is the unique solution to
The solution probability is then ρ t = 1 in the first time step. 12,13 Considering Prop. 1 and Fig. 2 , we can draw some comparative statics conclusions about the model's the behavior conditional on the continuation value W t+1 . Fig. 2 shows that given W t+1 , the solution β t is unaffected by the information cost parameter κ. Likewise, given W t+1 , the probabilities π t , as well as E πt V t+1 and K(β t ), are unaffected by κ. Thus, a rise in κ only affects the arrival rate ρ t = 1 κK(β t ) , slowing down the solution of the problem. Also, we see from the 12 In the continuous-time limit, the "immediate" solution occurs only when E η Vt+ ≥ Wt+ , for infinitesimal , and the solution to (15) reduces to β t = 0, with instantaneous arrival.
13 In an earlier version of this paper we also studied a specification that extended (2) to allow for a positive value of time f (h) in non-decision activities. When time is valuable, it is never optimal to make decisions with infinite precision. Nonetheless, the three solution classes described here still apply: if waiting is more valuable than the best option that can be chosen, then postponement is optimal; and if optimal accuracy can be achieved in less than one time step, then an immediate solution is optimal.
diagram that increasing the value of delay W t+1 increases β t (slows the arrival rate ρ t ), raising the expected payoff E πt V t+1 and the time devoted to the decision, κK(β t ). Similarly, an upward shift in the distribution of values V j,t+1 , in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance, will decrease β t , since this raises the curve g(β) ≡ ln(E η exp(β)V t+1 ). Intuitively, a favorable shift in V t+1 makes the DM more eager to finish the problem, and less concerned about distinguishing correctly between the different options.
Choosing a stopping time
The model in the previous section had three solution regimes (postponement, interior, or immediate solution), depending on how the value of delay, W t+1 , compared with the values V j,t+1 available. While the model displayed error-prone decisions across the alternatives i, it could also be regarded as an error-free choice of the arrival rate ρ t . That is, it could be regarded as a generalized optimal stopping problem, with the choice between stopping immediately (ρ t = 1) and postponing (ρ t = 0) supplemented by all intermediate probabilities ρ t ∈ (0, 1), in which the stopping hazard ρ t was chosen without error. This observation raises the question of how we might allow for errors in the stopping rate too, for consistency with our treatment of the choice across the alternatives i.
Hence, we next study an error-prone stopping problem, in which it is costly to choose the stopping rate ρ precisely. 14 Abstracting briefly from the choice across alternatives i, we assume the DM simply chooses between continuing a process, to obtain value W , or "stopping" that process to obtain value X. Previously, we interpreted "imprecise" choice as a uniform distribution over a set of alternatives; here, we interpret "imprecise" choice of the hazard rate as a uniform hazard with an exogenous rateρ. The constantρ is a free parameter in our framework, relating to the underlying speed at which the DM is capable of making decisions. Cost increases with deviations from the actual hazard from the uniform hazard at rateρ, as measured by KullbackLeibler divergence. 15 To make the problem meaningful, we also allow for an alternative use of time (besides decision-making), which we will call "work".
Let h t ∈ [0, 1] be time spent "working", and μ t be time spent "monitoring" the situation, to decide whether or not to stop. Let the output from work be f (h), satisfying
The stopping rate is governed by the following Bellman equation:
subject to:
and
The first constraint limits the precision of the choice of the stopping rate ρ. The relative entropy term in the control cost function is given by
14 This error-prone stopping decision is analogous to the "Errors-in-timing" model considered in CN15.
15 At first glance, one might wish to treat the choice to stop or continue in a single time step as a binary decision, applying the model from Sec. 2.1 with a uniform benchmark u ≡ {0.5, 0.5} on the two options. But such a model is not well behaved as we redefine time units; it would imply a 50% probability of adjustment in one period, conditional on indifference between stopping and continuation, regardless of the length of the time period. In other words, the continuous-time limit of such a model would imply perfectly rational timing, regardless of κ. The introduction of the benchmark stopping hazardρ is what gives our model a well-behaved continuous-time limit in which timing errors are still possible.
If we denote the multipliers on the constraints by λ μ and λ h , the first-order condition for ρ t can be written as
where the precision of the decision is indexed by β:
Solving for the equilibrium stopping rate ρ t , we obtain
. This equation expresses the stopping probability ρ t as a weighted binomial logit that places weightρ on stopping, and weight 1 −ρ on continuation. Note that as the precision β t approaches zero, the process stops with a constant hazardρ regardless of the value of stopping, while as β t → ∞, the process stops if and only if X t+1 > W t+1 . The parameterρ controls the speed of stopping; more exactly, it represents the stopping hazard when the DM is indifferent between stopping and continuing. Using this logit hazard formula, we can then write the decision entropy (20) as
The function K ρ (β) represents a cost function for precision; differentiation shows (see proof of
The model of Sec. 2.1 had two possible corner solutions, in which the decision process ended with probability zero or one in a single time step. In contrast, the present model penalizes stopping with probability zero or one, which simplifies the analysis by ensuring an interior solution for β t at any step of the backwards induction process defined by (17). To see this, write the time constraint as
where K ρ (β) is given by (26). Then we have: Proof. Note that for h ∈ [0, 1], the first-order condition (22) defines β as an increasing function of h. Since lim h→0 f (h) = ∞, the function starts at zero, and it increases continuously to β * 1 ≡ 1−δ κf (1) at h = 1. On the other hand, if we define z ≡ βD t+1 and
then by differentiating and simplifying we obtain
Therefore, if we graph (22) and (27) in (β, h) space, the curve (22) slopes upwards from the origin, and the curve (27) slopes downwards from (β, h) = (0, 1), except in the limiting case D t+1 = 0, when (27) becomes the horizontal line h = 1. Hence there is a unique solution β t > 0 and h t ∈ (0, 1], which is an interior solution unless D t+1 = 0 exactly. In the latter case, the solution reaches the corner h t = 1, with ρ t =ρ, and we can define β t = 
Choosing when to solve a problem
A situation in which a DM can choose between several options, but may also simply postpone that choice, effectively combines a static decision problem with an optimal stopping problem. A game, such as the bargaining game we consider later, may include both of these elements at various stages.
Therefore, we next study a situation that combines the two decisions analyzed thus far: a DM, subject to control costs, chooses a stopping time that determines when he will decide between several options j ∈ Γ ≡ {1, 2, ...n}. As in Section 2.1, the DM chooses a solution rate ρ for the choice problem, and a quicker solution implies a less precise choice across the alternatives j. But instead of assuming that ρ is chosen optimally, here we also constrain the precision of the choice of the solution rate ρ, as in Sec. 2.2. Errors in the choice of ρ amount to errors in the timing of the choice, as distinct from an error in which option is chosen. 16 This now leads us to consider three possible uses of time. First, let h ∈ [0, 1] be the time dedicated to non-decision activities, such as work or leisure. As before, we assume that nondecision activities yield payoffs f (h), satisfying (16). Second, let μ ∈ [0, 1] be the fraction of time spent "monitoring" whether the current moment is a good time to solve the decision problem. The precision of the solution rate ρ will be limited by monitoring time, under a constraint identical to (18). Finally, let τ ∈ [0, 1] be the fraction of time dedicated to actually choosing between options j. Since only a fraction of the DM's time is dedicated this choice, the precision of this choice problem is no longer constrained by 1/ρ (the expected duration of the decision), 16 The model developed in this subsection generalizes the benchmark specification of CN15 to allow for a nonlinear value of time.
as in (1). Instead, precision will be constrained by τ /ρ (expected time devoted to the decision problem, up until the solution arrives). Therefore, the decision process will satisfy the following Bellman equation: Node D:
Constraint:
Overall constraint:
Note: Decision maker (DM) chooses solution rate ρ t of decision; Nature lets conclusion arrive with probability ρ t . A slower decision allows more precise allocation of probabilities πj,t across alternatives i with values Vj,t+1, satisfying the constraint κπD( πt|| η) ≤ τ t/ρ t , where τ t is the fraction of time spent comparing alternatives i.
Choosing the solution rate ρ t is also costly, and must satisfy the constraint (30), where μ t is the fraction of time devoted to choosing ρ t . Time subscripts suppressed in diagram.
The first-order condition on π j is
which again implies a weighted multinomial logit when we impose n j=1 π j,t = 1:
and n j=1 π j = 1, and h + μ + τ ≤ 1.
Here, we have allowed for the possibility that precision in choice and precision in timing may have different time costs, paramerized by κ π and κ ρ , respectively. We will write the multipliers on the constraints as λ τ , λ μ , λ π , and λ h , respectively. The decision maker equalizes the marginal value of the three uses of time, implying:
Following equations (8)- (9), we can calculate the entropy cost D π,t paid to choose π j,t :
(36) The first-order condition for the solution rate ρ t is:
Following (21)- (24), we again see that the solution rate is a logit:
Equation (39) shows that ρ t is a weighted binary logit comparing the values of decision and postponement; it corresponds to equation (20) of CN15. Equation (41) represents an optimal tradeoff between the allocation of precision (and time) to the decision about when to adjust, and to the decision about which option to choose, when adjusting. The quantityṼ t+1 represents the expected value after adjustment, net of adjustment costs; the factor β π,t converts precision into time at rate κ π , time into utility at rate f (h t ), and next period's utility into utility now at rate 1 − δ, so that the payoff E πt V t+1 is commensurate with the precision measure D π,t . Using (36), we can calculatẽ
This corresponds to the explicit value function formula (15) stated in CN15. Finally, following (25)-(26), the "monitoring" time devoted to choosing the solution rate is
Do these first-order conditions define a unique solution for problem (28)-(31)? To address this question, note that conditional on the values V t+1 and W t+1 associated with the time t + 1 problem, the time t decision can be reduced to two equations. Specifically, the time constraint must bind, and the first-order condition for precision must be satisfied:
These two equations (illustrated by Fig. 4) Consider the special case κ π = κ λ ≡ κ. In this case, it is helpful to rewrite the decision problem in terms of the following set of alternatives:
This choice situation is equivalent to that modeled in problem (28), but simply treats postponement as one more alternative to be considered, rather than classifying it separately from the other options. Without loss of generality, suppose the firm chooses postponement with probability 1 − ρ, and draws from the remaining alternatives with probabilities π † j = ρπ j , where 1 − ρ + n j=1 π † j = 1. Now, using the parameter restriction κ π = κ λ , the two cost functions (29)-(30) can be summed as follows:
The expression in (49) is a relative entropy measure over the set of alternatives Γ † t : it is the Kullback-Leibler divergence of the probabilities (1 − ρ, π
It is a convex function of the probabilities (1 − ρ, π † ).
Therefore, when κ ρ = κ π ≡ κ, problem (28)-(31) can be rewritten equivalently as follows:
where τ † ≡ τ + μ is total time used for decision-making (including "monitoring"). Note that the objective function in (50) is equivalent to that in (28); and if κ ρ = κ π ≡ κ, then the constraints (51)-(52) are satisfied if and only (29)-(31) hold. † Thus, the firm's choice can be regarded as a single decision across the set of alternatives Γ † , subject to a relative entropy constraint. An advantage of writing the problem this way is that it maximizes a concave function over a convex set. Hence we can show that each backwards induction step has a unique solution: Proof. Since the payoff function is linear in the probabilities (1 − ρ, π † ), and concave in h, it is concave overall. Since relative entropy is a strictly convex function, (51) defines a convex set, as do the simplex constraints in (52). Thus, the Bellman equation maximizes a stictly concave function over a convex set (the intersection of the constraint sets), so there exists a unique solution to the problem. Now, if we graph (47) in (β, h) space, assumption (16) implies that it slopes upwards from the origin. Plugging (36), (40), and (45) into (49), we see that the total decision cost is zero when β = 0, and is strictly positive for all β > 0 unless min j V j,t+1 = max j V j,t+1 = W t+1 . Therefore curve (46) passes through the point (β, h) = (0, 1) and lies strictly below h = 1 for all β > 0 if min j V j,t+1 < max j V j,t+1 . Therefore (46) and (47) have a solution h ∈ (0, 1), β ∈ (0, 1−δ κf (1) ) which represents an interior solution for the problem (50)-(52). QED.
General case
For the general case where κ π = κ ρ , we can show the existence of a unique solution to any backwards induction step by showing that the slopes of (46) and (47) differ in sign. As Fig. 4 shows, first-order condition (47) gives h as an increasing function of β π . The harder question is the slope of constraint (46), viewed as a relation between β π and h. We can use the identities
Substituting, the time constraint becomes:
where ρ(β π ) is the function defined by (40). Note that, conditional on V t+1 and W t+1 , the righthand side of (53) is a function of β π , which we call t(β π ); it represents the total time devoted to decision-making, as a function of precision β π . Under very weak assumptions, we can show that t(β) slopes upward from t(0) = 0 at zero precision. Therefore the curve h = 1− t(β) given by (46) slopes downward, and hence the model has a unique interior optimum. Proof. The main point to prove is that the right-hand side of (53) is nondecreasing in β. Let us write (53) as h = 1 − t(β), where
Proposition 4 Suppose
m(β) ≡ E η exp(βV ), and ρ(β) =ρ Now by differentiating and simplifying, we can show that 
using (40). Notice that the first and last terms cancel; the remaining terms are The first term on the right-hand side of (55) is obviously nonnegative. In the second term on the right-hand side of (55), we have
This is the quantity that we signed in Lemma 1(c); since it represents a variance, it is strictly positive for all β ∈ [0, ∞) as long as min j V j < max j V j . Therefore both terms on the right-hand side of (55) are nonnegative, and in particular, we have t (β) > 0 strictly for all β ∈ (0, ∞) under the maintained assumptions of the proposition. Thus, the curve h = 1 − t(β π ) is weakly downward-sloping from h = 1 at β π = 0; it is strictly downward-sloping except in the limiting case min j V j,t+1 = max j V j,t+1 = W t+1 . This curve shifts smoothly with any change in V t+1 or W t+1 . The curve f (h) = 
Backwards induction
Propositions 3-4 established general conditions under which a backwards induction step of the form (28)-(31) has a unique, well-behaved optimum when future values V t+1 and W t+1 are taken as given. Now, we show that each backwards induction step acts as a contraction, implying that (28)-(31) also has a unique, well-behaved optimum when interpreted as an infinite-horizon dynamic programming problem. 
Proposition 5 Suppose f satisfies (16). Then: (a.) the operator defined by problem (28)-(31) is a contraction, and (b.) if the problem is defined over an infinite horizon and the options j = 1..n have timeindependent values V ss then (28)-(31) has a unique time-independent value
Note that 
Bargaining games
We now apply our decision framework to some simple sequential bargaining games. In the games, two impatient players, A and B, negotiate shares of a cake of size K. Each may propose a share between 0 and 1 to the other player, and may accept or reject an offer received from the other player. Accepting the other's offer ends the game. We allow for costly, error-prone decisions when making offers, and when deciding whether or not to accept them, so these games will be applications of the decision framework described in Prop. 4.
We compare four possible bargaining protocols, representing different assumptions about the set of signals that the players may exchange over the course of play.
• One particularly simple protocol is the rejectable offers protocol where the possible responses to any offer are signals meaning "yes" or "no". Accepting the offer by saying "yes" ends the game, while rejection returns the game to a situation with no offer outstanding.
The player who made a given offer cannot revise or withdraw that offer.
• A simple alternative is the alternating offers protocol where acceptance ("yes") ends the game, but rejection is equated with making a counteroffer. Therefore the responding player cannot "just say no", but must instead propose an alternative. Again, the proposer of a given offer cannot alter it.
• The withdrawable offers protocol generalizes the rejectable offers protocol by allowing either player to say "no" to the current offer, returning the game to a situation with no offer outstanding. That is, the recipient of an offer can accept it or reject it without offering an alternative, and the player that made the offer can likewise withdraw it without offering an alternative.
• Finally, the updateable offers protocol generalizes the alternating offers protocol by allowing either players to propose an alternative to the current offer. Thus, the responding player may accept or make a counterproposal, while the player that made a given proposal may instead substitute it by an updated proposal.
Note that under the alternating offers protocol, the responder must be careful not to propose an unfavorable alternative, and can take plenty of time to respond since the proposer can do nothing else until the responder acts. But in turn this gives both players an incentive to be very careful when making the first offer. So this protocol might be expected to imply substantial delay, compared with the other specifications. The updateable and withdrawable protocols are of particular interest because they are especially robust versions of the game, since they never oblige players to remain in an undesirable state.
We will solve the games by backwards induction from a finite ending time. Time steps are assumed discrete but very short, so we ignore the possibility that offers arrive simultaneously. Therefore in any of the four protocols considered, each player i ∈ {A, B} may be in one of three types of states at any time during play: 
Solving the rejectable offers game
First, we analyze a bargaining game under the rejectable offers protocol. Figures 5-7 
−i
t simultaneously (the figure is drawn from i's point of view; it could be redrawn from the perspective of −i by relabelling nodes appropriately). 19 If player i completes a decision, the game will be distributed across nodes M i t+1 (s) at time t + 1: an offer s made by player i will be on the table. If instead player −i completes a decision, the game will move to one of the nodes R i t+1 (s), indicating that an offer s has been made by −i. 20 To describe the decision problems in the game, it is easiest to work backwards from node R i t (s), at which player i is considering offer s received from −i, as illustrated in Figure 6 . In this figure, λ i t (s) represents the arrival rate of player i's decision, to accept with probability α i t (s) or reject with probability 1 − α i t (s). Policies λ i t (s) and α i t (s) solve the following problem:
s.t.:
The Bellman equation (64) Figure 7 . Here there is no decision to be made; player i simply waits for a response, setting h = 1. Therefore M i t (s) satisfies:
The subgame at a node where no offer has yet been made is slightly more complex, because, even taking as given the time t + 1 equilibrium, A's choice at time t interacts with B's choice 19 The simultaneous decision is indicated by the dashed oval surrounding the subnodes DM at t. Since we have assumed shares are chosen from the grid Γ s , the values that i chooses from at node
If instead player i fails to make a decision at node N i t , he will face an offer from −i with probability ρ
t , or will return to a node with no offer outstanding with probability 1 − ρ −i t . Therefore the continuation value for player i's problem is
But the continuation value W i t+1 is unknown unless we know the decision rate ρ −i t and probability allocation π −i t (s) of player −i; hence we must solve the problems of the two players simultaneously. We can find a Nash equilibrium iteratively by beginning with the initial guess W i t+1 ≈ N i t+1 , and then solving the following problem, using Prop. 4. 
and 
Numerical example: rejectable offers
The discussion thus far has outlined a single backwards induction step to update the values R i t (s), M i t (s), and N i t , and likewise for −i. Iterating backwards in time until all value functions have converged, we arrive at an equilibrium of the game. 21 Figure 8 illustrates a numerical example, for two risk-neutral agents that split a cake of size K = 100, under a parameterization chosen for computational convenience: κ = 0.2, δ = 0.0005, andρ = 0.005, and f (h) = Zh ζ with Z = 0.01 and ζ = 2/3. A discrete, evenly-spaced grid Γ s of offers is considered, from s = 0% to s = 100% by steps of size 0.1%. For simplicity, we assume a uniform default distribution on the grid Γ s :
where n = 1001 is the number of points in the grid. Likewise, we assume a uniform default distribution for the acceptance choice, setting (1 −ᾱ,ᾱ) = ( 1 /2, 1 /2). The decision arrival rate 21 Working backwards requires an initial guess of the value function at some hypothetical future time T , A good guess under a symmetric parameterization is N ρ is set low enough so that the probability of completing a decision in a single time step is close to zero; together with the low discount rate, it reflects our assumption that time steps are very brief. The offer step size is chosen fine enough to guarantee that equilibrium is unique (for further discussion, see Sec. 3.5 below). The precision cost κ is chosen large enough so that errors are visible in the graphs, without displaying a high degree of irrationality. The value of Z is a normalization, but its setting relative to cake size K matters: crucially, we wish to consider parameters such that negotiation is actually worthwhile. Under a symmetric parameterization, this requires that the present discounted value of never bargaining, and instead devoting all future time to alternative activities, Z/δ = 20, is less than the value of immediately ending the game by splitting the cake evenly, which is 50.
The reject. While it might appear on a first glance that R A (s) ≥ M A (s) for all s, this is not true around s ≈ 50, where R A (50) = 49.10 < M A (50) = 49.39. The reason is that regardless of who proposed s = 50, A can expect to receive the terminal payoff u A (50) = 50 with very high probability soon. But if A made the offer, then A only needs to wait in order to receive this terminal payoff; if instead B made the offer, then A needs to think about it in order to decide to accept. Hence the value of receiving an offer of a perfectly even split is slightly less than the value of having already made the same offer. Both of these values also exceed the initial value N A = N B = 48.14 (red star), reflecting the fact that if no offer is outstanding then players will need to think, and time will elapse, before the terminal payoff is received.
Thus we see that equilibrium outcomes are simple and highly rational, resembling the Rubinstein (1982) game; the actual split is typically near to 50/50, with a small advantage to the proposer, in spite of the presence of errors in the model. The modal proposal by A is 51.2, and 90% of all offers made by A lie in the interval [50,52] (top, right panel of Fig. 9 ). An even split is accepted with 99.6% probability, while A accepts the proposal s = 49 with 93.6% probability and s = 48 with 34.2% probability (last panel of the figure). However, some low-cost errors are present. For example, although it is hard to see in the top, right panel, A has a tiny, roughly constant probability (0.012%) of making any offer s in the range s > 55. These unacceptable offers are not very costly, because they simply postpone arrival of an agreement. On the other hand, the probability that A makes an offer below 50 declines extremely rapidly; only one in a million offers made by A lies in the range s ≤ 45.5. Low offers are very costly mistakes to A, since B accepts them with very high probability. While behavior in this example is close that found under full rationality, the bottom panels of Figure 9 show the obvious contrast with Rubinstein (1982) : agreement is not immediate. Instead, offers take time to arrive, and their order of arrival is an endogenous result of the model. The bottom right panel shows that, conditional on responding, A accepts any offer s ≥ 50 with probability α close to one. However, the bottom left panel shows that this response takes time, arriving with probability λ ≈ 3% in any single time step. This decision rate corresponds to spending roughly 40% of time choosing whether to accept or reject the outstanding offer (the vertical distance between the solid and dashed green lines in the second panel of the second row shows that τ ≈ 0.4). This time allocation remains roughly constant across offers s, except near s = 50, where the player is nearly indifferent between accepting and rejecting, so τ falls sharply, and instead the player devotes effort to finishing the decision quickly (we see a spike in the vertical distance μ above the solid green line, leading to the spike in the arrival rate ρ shown in the bottom left panel). In contrast, each player's offer arrival rate ρ is roughly 1% per time step at node N (red star in the bottom left panel). This slower arrival rate reflects the fact that making an offer requires the player to consider many options, rather than just two. Hence at node N , almost all time is devoted to choosing between possible offers (τ ≈ 0.9 at node N , seen as the vertical distance between the red star and the red cross in the second row, second panel).
Thus, taking into account both player's decisions, around fifty time steps are expected to pass before the first offer is made, and another thirty elapse before it is (usually) accepted. Indeed, the game usually ends with the acceptance of the first offer: the probability of this event is
s∈Γ s π i (s)α −i (s) = 82.5%. This is reminiscent of the fact that the first offer is accepted immediately in Rubinstein's equilibrium; but here there is a delay, and a non-negligible probability that the first offer fails.
A numerical example of alternating offers equilibrium is shown in Fig. 9 . Parameters are identical to the previous example, except that we must define a default distribution compatible with the choice set at node R i t (s) under alternating offers. To make the results quantitatively comparable with those from the rejectable offers case, we hold fixed the default probabilityᾱ associated with the option to accept. And conditional on making a counteroffer, we impose the same default offer probabilities that apply in state N i t . In other words, we benchmark the choice of offering any s ∈ Γ s , or accepting the outstanding offer s, against the following default probabilities:
withᾱ = 1 /2 and n = 1001 as before. The value functions, the initial offer probabilities, and the acceptance probabilities are very similar to those we saw before. As in the previous example, the offer that is actually accepted remains close to a 50/50 split, with a small advantage to the proposer. A's modal offer is now s = 50.8, and the probability that A's offer lies in [50,52] is 92%. As before, the game is likely to end with the acceptance of the first offer; the probability is 83.8%, slightly higher than in the rejectable offers case. Also, note that the second panel of the top row shows A's counteroffer probabilities γ A (s |s) alongside the initial offer probabilities π A t (s) associated with node N A t . The counteroffer probabilities (green, graphed conditional on an outstanding offer s = 0.5) are so similar to the initial offer probabilities that green curve is almost entirely obscured by the red curve representing π A t (s). Thus, the distribution of offers remains similar even after a first offer is rejected.
The most visible differences in this new specification relate to decision rates and time use. The first offer arrives at the rate ρ A t ≈ 1%, and responses to "good" offers arrive with roughly 3% probability per time step, as in the rejectable offers case. But rejecting a "bad" offer is now a harder decision, since it requires a counterproposal. Therefore the response rate to low offers drops back to λ A t (s) ≈ 1%, similar to the speed of making the first offer. Similarly, looking at time use (second row, second panel), we see that roughly 90% of A's time is dedicated to formulating an offer in state N A t (vertical distance between red star and red cross) and when A is facing a low offer (vertical distance between solid and dashed green lines). But when facing a good offer, A reallocates time from choosing a response (τ falls to 0.4), to concentrating on finishing the decision quickly (μ rises to roughly 0.5, and therefore the decision rate rises to 3% per time step).
Withdrawable or updateable offers
Withdrawable offers protocol
The sequence of choices in the withdrawable bargaining protocol is the same as in the rejectable offers protocol (illustrated by Figs. 5-7) , except that agent i at node M i t (s) has the option of withdrawing the outstanding offer, thus returning the game to node N i t , where no offer is outstanding. Note that choosing to withdraw does not immediately entail a choice across any other alternatives. Therefore player i's withdrawal decision at M i t (s) is an example of an error-prone stopping problem -as analyzed in Sec. 2.2 -instead of the error-prone decision problem analyzed in Sec. 2.3.
For comparability with previous results, the default withdrawal rate is set equal to the default decision rateρ = 0.005 assumed in previous simulations. All other default probabilities take the same values that were assumed in the rejectable offers case. We write the equilibrium withdrawal probability as ξ i t (s), with notation for the other policy functions as before. Then the value function at node M i t (s) satisfies
Figure 9: Equilibrium of alternating offers game.
Note: Player A behavior in equilibrium of alternating offers game (choices described by Prop. 4).
Objects at node N in red; node R in green; node M in blue. Likewise, the option to withdraw alters the equation for the value function R i t (s):
Results
The results of the withdrawable and updateable protocols are shown in Figures 10 and 11 , respectively. These graphs show a few more curves than Figs. 8-9, corresponding to the additional decisions that play a role in the updateable and withdrawable specifications. Nonetheless, a brief inspection shows close similarities with our previous results. In particular, the curves shown in Fig. 8 for the rejectable offers protocol are almost unchanged in Fig. 10 , which illustrates the withdrawable offers protocol. Likewise, the curves seen in Fig. 9 (alternating offers) are almost identical to the corresponding curves in Fig. 11 (updateable offers) . The most noteworthy difference is seen in the value function M A (s), seen in blue in the top left panels of Figs. 8-11. If offers can be withdrawn or updated, then an excessively low offer is a less costly mistake. Therefore, the curve M A (s) is higher and less steeply sloped over the range s < 50 in Figs. 10-11 than it was in Figs. 8-9, which described protocols under which rescinding an offer was impossible.
The additional curves seen in the withdrawal decision. When player A has made a reasonable offer that is likely to be accepted (s ≈ 50), she devotes almost all her time to work (h ≈ 0.9). But when the outstanding offer is slightly below 50, her time use shifts dramatically, concentrating entirely on the withdrawal decision (h ≈ 0); thus the probability of withdrawal rises from near zero to roughly 4% per period (blue curve in bottom left panel). When the outstanding offer is instead above 50, A devotes roughly half her time to the withdrawal decision (h ≈ 0.5); an excessively high offer is a less costly error than an excessively low one, but player A still stands to gain by rescinding her unacceptable offer, so she withdraws it with roughly 3% probability per period.
The interpretation of the blue curves in Fig. 11 (updateable offers protocol) is similar. In this protocol there are three uses of time at node M A (s), as seen in the middle right panel: the height of the dashed blue line represents h ("work"), the distance above the solid blue line represents μ (time devoted to choosing whether to update the current offer), and the distance between the solid and dashed lines represents τ (time devoted to deciding which new offer to make). Again we see that when the outstanding offer is sufficiently close to 50, almost all time is spent working. But for s < 50, h falls rapidly to zero as player A devotes time to decisionmaking instead, and the arrival rate of an updated offer is between 3% and 4% per period. For s > 50, time use is divided more or less equally between work and decision-making, and an updated offer arrives with roughly 1.5% probability per time step.
The top right panel of Fig. 11 also features a blue curve which represents the distribution υ A (s |s) of updated offers s . We illustrate this distribution conditional on the outstanding offer s = 0.45, a relatively bad offer which player B is eager to accept and player A is eager to update.
As the middle right panel shows, conditional on s = 0.45 player A devotes most of her time to deciding to rescind the offer, and less time to choosing an appropriate counteroffer (μ >> τ at s = 0.45). That is, in her hurry to correct a poor offer, player A hastily proposes an alternative. Therefore the precision of the updated offer is low, which explains why the blue curve in the top right panel (the distribution υ A of updated offers s ) is much less sharply peaked than the red curve (the distribution π of initial offers s). This can also be seen in the middle left panel, which shows the precision β of the distribution of counteroffers (in blue). Updated offers are most precise when the outstanding offer s is close to the optimum (just above 50), and rapidly become imprecise otherwise, especially if the outstanding offer is too low instead of too high.
While the strategies played under the withdrawable and updateable protocols are more complex than those associated with the first two frameworks, ultimately the most striking conclusion about the cases compared is the similarity of the equilibrium distribution of outcomes in all four protocols. The first offer is expected to arrive after approximately 50 time steps. Initial offers are tightly clustered around a 50/50 split in all specifications, with a small advantage to the proposer. Offers in this range are rarely withdrawn or updated; instead they are typically accepted after roughly 30 periods. The probability that the first offer is accepted, thus ending the game, is 80.3% and 72.6% under the withdrawable and updateable protocols, respectively, somewhat lower than the probabilities for the other protocols considered. Stationarity of the game implies that under the rejectable and withdrawable protocols, subsequent offers are drawn from the same distribution as the first if the first is rescinded. The distributions of counteroffers in the alternating and updateable protocols, and the arrival rates of these counteroffers, are also very similar to the distribution of initial offers. When an update occurs under the updateable protocol, it is drawn slowly from a more tightly clustered distribution if the outstanding offer was already close to the optimal offer, and it is drawn quickly with lower precision if the outstanding offer was excessively generous; but updates are unlikely events ex ante.
The unimportance of changes in the bargaining protocol recalls and reinforces some intuitions from full-information games. Indeed, Perry and Reny (1993) argue that under full rationality, bargaining protocols with rejection and with proposal of alternatives are equivalent; therefore they focus only on the latter. While these protocols are not formally equivalent in the presence of costly, error-prone choice, nonetheless our results show that they are very similar when costs are parameterized as we have done here. Likewise, the ability to rescind an offer (prior to acceptance) plays no role in a fully rational game, since no player will make an offer that he perceives to be suboptimal. In a bargaining game where players may make mistakes, the ability to rescind an offer may obviously be valuable ex post when an error occurs. Nonetheless, our results suggest that the possibility of rescinding offers also has little effect on the value of a game ex ante, as long as players have the ability to exert cognitive effort in order to avoid costly errors. Note: Player A behavior in equilibrium of updateable offers game (choices described by Prop. 4).
Objects at node N in red; node R in green; node M in blue. 
Comparative statics
We next explore how our results change as parameters vary. Figure 12 illustrates a comparative statics exercise in which we make time inherently more valuable, raising the productivity of alternative activities from its benchmark value of Z = 1 to Z = 2. (See the Appendix for the graphs in this subsection and the following one.) The setup and the parameters are otherwise identical to the rejectable offers benchmark of Fig. 8 . Since time is more costly, less of it is devoted to the decision. Comparing the red cross in the middle-right panel of Fig. 12 to that of Fig. 8 , the time devoted to alternative activities rises from only h = 0.035 when Z = 1 to h = 0.397 when Z = 2. Therefore the decision arrives more slowly, and with less accuracy. In particular, the probability that Z offers s ∈ [49, 52] falls from 93.4% in the benchmark specification to 86.6% when Z = 2. At the same time, the arrival rate of the first offer falls from 1.3% per time step in the benchmark specification to 0.9% per time step when Z = 2 (red star in bottom left panel of the figure), and the arrival rate of a decision to reject an offer falls from roughly 3% per time step to roughly 1.6% per time step. Thus, the main impact of making time in alternative activities more valuable is to slow down the arrival of the decision. Similar effects are observed in several other comparative statics exercises (these additional figures are not shown). In particular, with Z = 1, lowering the noise parameter from κ = 0.2 to κ = 0.02 increases the arrival rate of initial offers from 1.3% per time step to 6.4% per time step and shrinks the range of offers made in equilibrium. Likewise, lowering the benchmark arrival rateρ from 0.005 to 0.001 slows down the arrival rate of initial offers, from 1.3% per time step to 0.95% per time step, while raisingρ to 0.01 raises the arrival rate of initial offers to 1.5% per time step.
A rather different comparative statics exercise is considered in Fig. 13 , of alternative activities is raised to Z = 3. The interesting aspect of this example is that now the value of alternative activities is so high that the players would be better off never ending the game by splitting this "rotten pie". That is, the value of "working" full time forever, h(1)/δ = Z/δ = 60 exceeds the value of half the pie (50) in this example.
The results change in a sensible way. If these players were fully rational, they would simply avoid negotiating altogether. Being imperfectly rational, they are not entirely sure whether they should think about negotiations. Therefore they do spend some time analyzing the bargaining game, but the red dot in the middle-right panel of Fig. 13 shows that almost all their time is devoted to "work" (h = 0.95). Therefore offers arrive very slowly; initial offers arrive with probability 0.45% per time step (red star in the bottom-left panel). Since ending the game by accepting a 50/50 share is worse than continuing without agreement, the probability of offering or accepting equal shares is very close to zero; A's acceptance probability jumps close to one only when an offer s ≥ 60 is received. Since A knows that B is unlikely to accept offers above s = 40, on the rare occasions when A does make offers, some of these are as generous as s = 42.5. Indeed, the two panels in the top row show that A is almost indifferent about what offer she makes as long as her offer will be rejected almost certainly by B.
When is equilibrium unique?
The examples analyzed thus far, which assumed symmetric parameters for the two players, were calculated from a symmetric initial guess, and yielded symmetric equilibria. However, we have not yet investigated whether other equilibria might also exist.
The alternating offers game of Rubinstein (1982) implies a unique equilibrium with immediate agreement. In Perry and Reny's (1993) game with fixed time costs for decisions, agreement is not immediate, and multiple equilibria occur for two distinct reasons. First, multiplicity may arise due to the possibility of exactly simultaneous actions. Player i may make an offer at time t which she expects will be accepted by −i; this is supported as an equilibrium if −i expects that his offer at t would be rejected. Since the same argument can be made for either player, which player proposes at a given point in time is not uniquely determined. Second, the game of Perry and Reny displays multiple equilibria in which one of the agents expects, and on average receives, a higher share than the other. Thus, even under symmetric parameters, the expected payoffs of A and B may differ.
Multiplicity of the first type is ruled out almost by construction in our model, since precise control of timing is costly. While it is feasible in this model to make a proposal with probability one in a single discrete time step, such a rapid choice implies low precision but requires a high fraction of time devoted to monitoring, so this is usually suboptimal. Knowing that i might complete an offer over the interval [t, t + 1] with a small positive probability does not suffice to rule out decision effort by player −i. Therefore, in equilibrium at node N i , both players think simultaneously about making offers.
The possibility of multiplicity of expected shares is a separate issue from multiplicity in timing. To investigate this question, we now report some examples computed from asymmetric initial guesses, and check whether they converge to a symmetric equilibrium. Our baseline simulation computed the rejectable offers scenario from a symmetric initial guess, N A T = N B T = 50, which converged to the symmetric equilibrium shown in Sec. 3.1, with N A = N B = 48.1811. To check for multiplicity, we have run the same calculation from a highly asymmetric initial guess, N A T = 80, N B T = 20. Under the baseline parameterization -which assumes a fine grid Γ s on [0, 100] by steps of size 0.1 -we find that the asymmetry in players' expected shares unravels as backwards induction proceeds, converging finally to the same symmetric equilibrium, with N A = N B = 48.1811. The left panel of Figure 14 shows the value functions from both simulations. The baseline simulation that starts from a symmetric guess is plotted with M A (s) in blue and R A (s) in green. The simulation that starts from an asymmetric guess is plotted showing both functions in red, but the red lines are invisible because they are exactly overlaid by the blue and green lines.
Unravelling from the asymmetric initial guess happens very slowly. When player A expects to receive a high share (represented by a high value of N A t+1 ), she will reject low offers, so N A t cannot lie far below the assumed value of N A t+1 . Indeed, if offers are constrained to a sufficiently coarse discrete grid, backwards induction may get "trapped" at a distribution of offers that remains asymmetrically favorable to one of the players. In other words, on a coarse grid, multiple equilibria may be sustained. This is illustrated in the right panel of Figure 14 In all the cases shown in the two panels of the figure, a fully symmetric equilibrium is found if we start from a symmetric guess. But as the figure shows, on a coarse grid, backwards induction may instead converge to an asymmetric equilibrium. As long as the grid is sufficiently fine, backwards induction converges to a unique equilibrium, which is symmetric as long as the two players have symmetric parameters. It is reasonable to conjecture that equilibrium is unique if the game is defined on a continuous space of possible offers, but demonstrating this rigorously is beyond the scope of the numerical analysis of this paper.
Additional exercises were also performed (graphs available on request) that lowered the decision noise parameter from its benchmark value of κ = 0.2 to κ = 0.02, in order to explore how the degree of rationality affects multiplicity of equilibrium. We find that if decisions are less costly, then a wider range of equilibrium shares can be sustained, conditional on a given discrete grid. Assuming κ = 0.02 and a step size of 2.5, backwards induction from a guess favorable to A converges to N A = 76.7, N B = 22.4. With step size 0.5, the same calculation converges to N A = 62.1, N B = 37.3; and even with step size 0.25, it converges to N A = 54.8, N B = 44.6. We only find uniqueness when we go all the way to step size 0.1; then backwards induction from an asymmetric starting guess converges all the way to a symmetric equilibrium with N A = N B = 49.66. 25 The solid curves are identical to those shown in the left panel of the figure.
Conclusions
This paper has presented a model of a near-rational decision-maker whose choices require time. Concretely, we consider a time-consuming decision across several feasible options, in which the a quick choice achieves low precision, while slower choice can achieve arbitrarily high precision, selecting with probability one the action with highest gross value. To maximize payoffs net of decision costs, the decision-maker may prefer to make some "errors", because selecting the most valuable option with probability one would take too much time. But the optimality of this interior solution for precision depends on parameters; there are also two types of corner solutions that may arise. If the value of delaying any choice exceeds the gross value of the best option available, then it is better to simply postpone the decision. When a random choice across the available options is more valuable than postponement, then it is instead preferrable to complete the decision immediately (that is, within a single period).
However, if we consider that postponement and immediate random action are just two more available options, then we might expect choices across these options to be subject to error as well. Therefore, we generalize our initial model to allow for errors in the timing of decisions, as well as errors in the decisions per se. In the general model, where both choices and the timing of those choices require costly deliberation, optimal decision-making is characterized by an interior solution that varies smoothly with the underlying parameters. This occurs because errors in the timing of choice eliminate the corner solutions that otherwise complicate the analysis.
When this model of decision-making is embedded inside a game, the time devoted to choice must be reflected in the extensive form. Error-prone choice is known to be helpful for predicting play in extensive form games (e.g. McKelvey and Palfrey, 1998; Anderson, Goeree, and Holt, 2002). But while previous work focused on games in which the timing of decisions was fixed exogenously at the outset by the extensive form, in our setup costly, error-prone choice endogenizes the timing of decisions. This could prove to be a useful extension of the control cost equilibrium concept, and it would be interesting to test its performance in the laboratory, especially in experiments where players make intermittent decisions in continuous time.
As an application, this paper considers a sequential bargaining game. Two players may make offers to split a pie; making an offer is a time-consuming, error-prone decision. A player that has received an offer may accept the offer, ending the game, or reject it, returning the game to a state where no offer is outstanding; this binary choice is also a time-consuming, error-prone decision. Several other protocols are also considered, in which rejecting an offer requires the formulation of an alternative offer, or in which the proposer may withdraw or update the offer.
Numerical simulations of these bargaining games reveal an equilibrium structure very similar to that of Rubinstein (1982) , except that agreement is not achieved instantaneously, and offers are sometimes rejected. Under a symmetric parameterization, there is a high probability of a roughly even split of the pie. When no offer is outstanding, both players simultaneously devote part of their time to formulating offers. Players typically propose shares slightly favorable to themselves, and are usually willing to accept shares that are slightly unfavorable to themselves. Sometimes players propose shares excessively favorable to themselves, which are typically rejected; proposing shares that are excessively generous to the opponent is a much more costly mistake and therefore occurs less frequently in equilibrium.
Perry and Reny (1993) also considered a sequential bargaining game with time-consuming formulation of offers. While their game exhibited two types of multiplicity of equilibrium, we instead find a unique equilibrium as long as offers are drawn from a sufficiently fine grid. Assuming higher noise in decision-making also makes uniqueness more likely. Thus we find that the results of the Rubinstein (1982) and Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) games are more robust than Perry and Reny's generalization suggested. Equilibrium calculated from asymmetric starting guess is plotted in red. Equilibrium calculated from symmetric starting guess is plotted in green and blue, but is numerically identical and therefore covers up the red lines.
Right panel: Examples of multiplicity when offer grid is coarse. Four simulations shown.
Parameters same as benchmark equilibrium of Fig. 8 , except for step size in grid Γ s .
Backwards induction from asymmetric guess with step size 0.1 (solid) or step size 0.5 (dash-dot) converges to symmetric equilibrium, indicating uniqueness.
Backwards induction from asymmetric guess with step size 1 (dash) or 2.5 (dot) converges to asymmetric equilibrium; indicates that multiple equilibrium are found, depending on initial guess.
